Middle East Center lecture series on The Iraq Crisis
Justin Vaisse, The
Brookings Institution, March 11th, 2003
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Thanks for inviting me today : I'm speaking on what is probably one of the
worst days in French – US relations since 1966 or 1956 ! I'm
kidding : one should not exaggerate the impact of the current crisis on
French – US relations. First, there are dense non-governmental relations (cultural,
business, academic, etc.) ; and second, evenon the governmental level,
we're doing a lot together : fight against terrorism, Balkans, Ivory
Coast, etc. – don't lose the big picture. Last but not least, experts of French
– US relations, including me, traditionally make the point that we've never
waged war against one another (unlike with UK, Spain, Italy, Japan, Germany…),
that there has been a wonderful friendship for two centuries, etc. But they're
actually wrong ! We have always been allies in hard times, but quarrels,
at times acrimonious, have usually marked the relationship most of the time.
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Distance from policy of my government – I'm explaining it, not defending
it. My personnal position can come close
to it, but it is not identical. I must say that even if I disagreed with some
of recent Chirac moves, at this point there is this kind of regrettable
development where your credibility is
at stake – many people have suggested that France was just posturing, was just
doing that to look important, to reap small political benefits, and that in the
end she is somehow too coward to challenge the US directly… which is an
inaccurate way to describe the situation altogether, and I'll get back to
that ; the point is that giving in now would mean confirming the
stereotypes about France and saying that it was not about Iraq, it was not
about the region, it was not about principles, etc.
- short history of recent French -
US relations
- reasons for current stance :
1/ wrong reasons and stereotypes
- reasons for current stance :
2/ real reasons and their respective weight, including views on terrorism, on
Western – Islam relations, domestic considerations, including large muslim
populations, views of world order.
- Anti-Americanism and Francophobia
– why a fixation on France and not Germany, Russia ?
- A rare moment of unanimity on
9/11, thousands of French people at the American Embassy and at American
consulates all over France ; Le Monde headline on 9/12 :
"We are all Americans" ; Chirac first head of state to visit New
York City ; at NATO : article 5 invoked ; France had rotating
presidency of UN and helped pass important UN resolutions ; then
intervention in Afghanistan : France supported and wanted to send troops
but was rebuffed by the Pentagon ("Belgrade bridge syndrom", form the
Kosovo war) ; then things got more acrimonious, because of the "Axis
of evil" speech and Guantanamo ; but the big picture was that cooperation
had increased a great deal.
After hard discussions in September
– October 2002, resolution 1441 was adopted in early November : France and
the United States seemed to have overcome their differences and agreed on a
common approach to Iraq[i]. A basic agreement seemed to have been reached—if
Iraq willingly disarmed Washington would forego regime change; if it did not,
the United States would lead a coalition to disarm Iraq by changing the regime
by force.
The current dispute arises from the
interpretation of those commitments. For the US : essence of 1441 was voluntary Iraqi disarmament—if Iraq
failed to demonstrate that it was free of weapons of mass destruction, the
threat of "serious consequences" meant the use of military force.
Many Europeans, on the other hand instead put the emphasis on disarmament by
weapons inspectors. And the US government took part in creating the expectation
of a "smoking gun" by not only agreeing to set up inspectors with
specific rights to go here and there in Iraq (se text of 1441), but also by
publicly giving them intelligence to find hidden weapons…
So France
and Germany argue that the current situation need not yet be considered a casus belli, that 1441 contains no
timetable for action, and disarmament by more intrusive inspections, so long as
they can be maintained, remain a better approach than war. These European
governments seem to be making the case for an enhanced form of containment,
even though one can question this point (see Jacques Chirac speech yesterday on
French television : he recognized that the American – British military buildup made Saddam comply, and
would like to see that continue so as to achieve disarmament… but who pays for
that ?)
- Commercial
interests ? : French exports to and imports from Iraq account
for 0.2 percent and 0.3 percent of its overall exports and imports ;
France is indeed owed approximately $5 billion from Iraq from previous deals,
but it also understands that this money is highly unlikely to be paid so long
as Saddam is in power[ii].
The same is true for oil contracts that have reportedly been agreed – not
signed –between French oil companies and the current regime (Majnoon for
TotalFinaElf). The bottom line is that if commercial interests were the main
factor driving policy, the appropriate strategy for France and Germany would be
to back the U.S. threat of force, join the coalition, and insist on a share of
the spoils—including debt repayment and the honoring of oil contracts.
- Anti-Americanism ? 1/ has been
historically on the decline (see polls) 2/ see Afghanistan : France and
Germany strongly supported the action, which was backed by 73 percent and 65
percent of their respective populations. A Social Democratic/Green majority in
the German Bundestag supported sending 3,900 German combat troops to fight
alongside the Americans, and a Socialist-Communist-Green coalition in France
authorized the sending of French troops[iii].
Also, if it was AntiAmericansim, why would traditionally pro-American countries
such as the UK (82%) and the Netherlands (80%) oppose this ?
- Mission to check the US power, concern
about "hyperpower" ? No : see also Afghanistan :
France tried to do more and send jets, soldiers… I have worked as a consultant
to the Quai d'Orsay : there is no "grand strategy" about the
US ; good expertise and lot of work on Europe, Middle East, Africa, Asia,
but not enough on America itself. Can only be a secondary cause (see below).
- Pacifism ? See Bosnia in May – June 1995, when the UN peacekeepers
were taken hostage = reverse situation, Chirac forced Clinton to take military
action by initiating the rapid reaction force with UK. See also use of force to
ensure stability in Africa, French defense budgets too low but on the rise – a
real difference between France and UK on the one hand, and other European
countries on the other hand + military transformation from conscription to
professional armed forces.
1/
Terrorism : war will fuel
recruitment. Iraq not related to Al Qaeda : Antiterrorist judge Jean-Louis
Bruguière (500 arrests & 1000 searches since 1993 – US officials call him
in LAT, Oct. 14th, 2001
"one of the world's best counter-terrorism experts") says that no
mention of this country whatsoever during its many interrogations of
terrorists. A personal bet : Al Qaeda is present in just every country,
everywhere (so bomb the UK, Spain, France… New Jersey, etc.), but not in Iraq –
and to the extent that it is, it's in the Kurdish – US controlled area, which
bodes ill for a post-Sadam Iraq, as it is much easier for a dictator to keep
them away from Iraq than for an American administrator.
France has known a lot of terrorist attacks (esp. In
1982, 1986, 1995-96), including two recent from Al Qaeda in 2002 (in Karachi –
11 engineers dead - and against the oil tanker Limburg in the sea of Yemen).
2/ Western – Islam relations and conception of
war ; fear that it might play into the hands of the nationalists
everywhere, strengthen the perception of a "clash of civilizations".
Strong opinion that war should be considered only as a last resort ; here,
there is a US - Europe difference at
play : having experienced military conflict on their continent within
living memory, Europeans feel they know more about its horrific consequences
than Americans, and their threshold for deciding when war as a last resort
becomes necessary is consequently higher. On the other hand, another
significant difference in this respect : not having experienced 9/11.
Europeans
are far more pessimistic about being able to stabilize Iraq than Americans, or
at least the Bush administration. Spurred on by their immense power and general
historical optimism, Americans seem confident that they can meet the challenge
of bringing freedom, stability, and democracy to a post-Saddam Iraq. Europeans,
on the other hand—especially the British and French, the Mandatory Powers for
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Palestine after World War I—see little reason to
expect the project to be a success based on their colonial experience in the
Arab world[iv].
A more
personal factor : Chirac has lived in Algeria, first as a soldier
(1956-57), then as an administrator, with his family (1959) ; he also
knows the Gulf region well. He personnally thinks that war is not the way to go
to modernize the Arab / Muslim world.
This must also be put in the
context of traditional French Arab policy and good relations with Arab
countries (very dense political and cultural relations with Algeria, Morocco,
Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon…).
3/ domestic considerations : France is home to an estimated 4 to
5 million Muslims, roughly half of whom are French citizens, out of a
population of 60 million. While France has integrated numerous waves of
immigrants in the past, this new influx poses new challenges. Integration is
not going smoothly : ghettoisation, school failures, difficulty to
integrate the job system, racim, etc.
This has
basically two aspects : 1/ lack of social and political integration 2/
difficulty of integrating Islam into French secular system, called laïcité,
and many negative consequences : recruitment of disenfranchised young
Arabs by terrorist networks (see bio of Zacharias Moussaoui) ; gender
problems ; community fighting and anti-semitic acts (called
"Judeophoby" rahter than traditional antisemitism – ie linked to the
Israeli – Palestinian conflict rather than traditionnal XIXth and XXth century
antisemitism).
The
Israel / Palestine issue is much more important than Iraq. See First Gulf War =
71% of approval of Mitterrand in the French Arab – Muslim community (banlieues). And they have basically no voting power (half are not
citizens ; other half doesn't vote much and is not mobilized), so the
situation is different from the US. Bottom line : French Muslim population
doesn't dictate foreign policy on Iraq, but it's a concern.
It
should also be noticed that Islam in France is undergoing a deep transformation
– Europe is indeed one of the places where Islam is tranformed, where Muslims
learn to accommodate their faith with modernity. Cf. Tariq Ramadan. Frabce is
well placed to give birth to a moderate and tolerant brand of Islam ; and
it may reverberate on Maghrib countries because of dense ties.
4/
views on world order: appeal to
multipolarity is a factor, but is secondary to the merits of one
specific issue ; that is to say, if we agree on an issue, the fact that
the US is leading will be welcomed (Afghanistan ; North Korea) ; but
if we disagree (Iraq), the fact that the US tries to impose its views will add
to French determination ; hence the talk of "multipolar world",
etc.
Why France-bashing and nothing for
Germany or Russia ? Objective reasons : 1/ "leader of the
pack" ; 2/ veto power, unlike Germany ; 3/ impression (probably
accurate) that if France had not opposed, everybody would have gone
along : other countries, democrats, US public opinion… ; 4/ appeal to
universalism, which frustrates George W. Bush's own appeal to
universalism ; 5/ debate is more and more being framed as "for or
against Sadam", not as : what best protects us ?, so French are
portraited as protecting Sadam; 6/ impression of treason from France, a
traditional ally. Frustrated partiotim explains French-bashing.
One personal point –
The
Arab world is changing, and Islam is changing under the effects of
globalization, but alos demographic trends (except maybe Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan) and progress in alphabetization of women. The crisis now is largely a
demographic transition crisis, as all countries and areas in demographic
transitions have known them
See
Algeria : 7.3 children / women in 1980, only 3.1 now. This trend is
evident in Central Asian republics, Iran, Turkey, Maghrib all under 3.4 ;
Saudia Arabia, Pakistan above 5.6 (2001).
… This doesn't mean we shouldn't
fight terrorism ; we should definitely, and are doing it indeed. But a war
in Iraq could go against the modernization process, by coalescing
anti-modernist forces by giving them a common ennemy : American
imperialism, by cristallizing opposition between the West and Islam, by fueling
resentment, etc. On the whole, this may not necessarily help the moderates.
This may reinforce the impression that modernization and democracy are foreign
things. And there is some impatience at play, and the illusion that you can
intervene with success in such a long-term civilization process.
Could this have gone more
smoothly ? I'm under the impression that Bush and Chirac have mismanaged
the whole issue and French – US relations… but at the same time, even if one
can always dream that there might have been more clever ways to disagree,
there's the blunt fact that the disagreement was there in August, and we're
still at the same point. Was it possible to make the confrontation smoother ?
I'm not so sure.