Bringing Out the Animal In
Us: A Frenchman's Journey in Francophobe America
Financial Times, March 15, 2003
Justin Vaisse, Visiting Fellow, Center on the United States and France
A
few weeks ago in Baltimore a woman heard me speaking French with my wife, and,
after hesitating for a while, she approached us. "I want to thank you very
warmly for the position that your government is taking on the question of war
with Iraq," she said. "This is important, and I am so grateful to
you."
I
understood that she intended a compliment. But at the moment, I'm a bit wary
about being defined by my nationality. There are shock-jocks near Atlanta
offering people the chance to smash a Peugeot for $10, just out of anger at
France; there is a bar owner in Florida pouring French wine onto the street;
and French-bashing jokes are being passed around the Internet like, well, a
French whore. And now I'm being thanked for being French.
But,
couldn't I be both French and pro-war? Or more to the point, couldn't I simply
hold a more nuanced position, estimating that the costs of a war probably
outweigh the benefits, while also believing that French President Jacques
Chirac's hardball diplomacy is as harmful as George W. Bush's?
It
seems there is not much room left for such subtleties these days in Washington.
"Either you're with us or you're against us." Bush's black-and-white
view of the war on terrorism seems to apply to national identity, too. Either
you're French or you're Churchillian. Either you're American or you're an
appeaser. Such stereotyping has made it difficult to hold serious transatlantic
discussions about Iraq. Even the moderate and generally perceptive columnist,
Thomas Friedman of The New York Times, while acknowledging that there are good
arguments to be made against the war, writes that he doesn't buy these very
same arguments when they come from France or Germany. When voiced by these
countries, he says, these arguments stem from "expedience," "weakness"
or "identity crisis," not from real belief.
Back
in Paris last year, and the years before that, I used to begin my classes on
American Foreign policy and on U.S.-French relations by examining clichés,
stereotypes and even conspiracy theories about the U.S. We all know them:
America is a society of cynical plutocrats, bigoted rednecks, obese SUV drivers
and trigger-happy cowboys who view the world in black and white and couldn't
care less if the rest of us object to their grabbing Iraqi oil.
My
students had learned to question what mainstream newspapers and governments
tell them. But many of them still needed to learn not to be too clever by half.
The opposite of anti-Americanism is not philo-Americanism, I explained to them.
Rather, it is knowledge, complexity, nuance, distance.
Last
spring, I began to study the mirror image of French anti-Americanism:
francophobia, or France-bashing, here in the US. American francophobia has a
long history, although certainly not as glorious and diverse as French
anti-Americanism, and not as defining of identity as British francophobia. In
unfriendly American eyes, France is a cowardly and effete nation that never met
a dictator it couldn't appease. It is immoral, venal, anti-Semitic, arrogant,
insignificant, and nostalgic for past glory. It is also elitist, dirty, lazy,
and it is anti-American. Sure, anti-Americanism and francophobia can be gut
feelings. But most of the time, the objective is simply to undermine your
opponent's image and credibility, rather than to engage in genuine debate. When
you're a "cheese-eating surrender monkey" or a "simplistic
cowboy," nobody needs to care about the validity of your arguments.
Last
year now seems like the good old days when I could study these clichés from an
academic distance. When I arrived in Washington last autumn, in the midst of
the negotiations of what would become UN resolution 1441, France-bashing was on
the rise again. Columnist George Will was putting worn-out clichés to work once
more, reminding readers that France's "great-power pretenses have been
increasingly unconvincing since the Franco-Prussian war," and that
"the French rooster crows during Europe's dusk."
But
that was the gentle stuff—there was much more to come. The climate began to
deteriorate further after January 20, when Chirac made it clear he saw no
reason for war at this point. U.S. conservatives and neo-conservatives switched
to full campaign mode in favor of an early military intervention, with France
as an obstacle to overcome. Some media outlets—particularly, but not only,
those belonging to Rupert Murdoch, from the low-brow Fox News network to the
more intellectual Weekly Standard magazine—attacked France with renewed
vigor.
At
first, I enjoyed this new wave of clichés, which represented a windfall for an
academic study of American francophobia in real time. I also found many of the
cartoons, late-night comedians and Internet jokes to be quite funny
("Going to war without France is like going hunting without an
accordion.") Then I began to wonder if this current France-bashing fever
was not surpassing previous ones—that of Spring 2002, caused by concern over
anti-Semitic acts in France, and certainly those of 1995, when Paris expelled
CIA spies, and 1986, when France denied overflight rights to American bombers
for a military operation against Libya. Finally, even while being happy as an
academic for this francophobe creativity, I began to be alarmed by the
virulence of its promoters.
But
a more personal irritation came from two front-page
spreads in the New York Post, another Murdoch outlet. The first showed a
military cemetery in Normandy, and blared in oversize print: "They died
for France but France has forgotten." Beyond the obvious historical
simplification, two false premises shocked me: the idea that France was
ungrateful, and the assumption that French gratitude was owed to a specific
Bush administration policy rather than to the American heroes of an earlier
era.
Indeed,
this latter assumption seemed to trivialise the sacrifices of America's greatest
generation by reducing them to a cynical bid to secure unquestioning obedience
and acquiescence to all American policies. Like every Frenchman, I am certainly
grateful to America for the liberation of France. I am certainly grateful that
General Patton and the U.S. Third Army (and not the Russians) liberated my
grandfather, a Resistance fighter working for British Intelligence, from the
Nazi Death Camp at Buchenwald. But do I ask Americans to support Chirac's
policy in Africa to thank France for its help during the American Revolution?
Tucker
Carlson, the provocative anchor of CNN's Crossfire presented the second New
York Post cover to me when I was invited on the show to talk about French?US relations. He had warned me that he would be asking
nasty questions during the show but that "deep down, [he] loved
France." True to his promise, he began the interview by declaring "I
don't know how long you've been in the land of the free, the home of the
brave—probably long enough to know what people are saying about your
homeland." Then he showed a doctored front page photo of the Post
in which the heads of the French and German representatives to the UN were
replaced by weasel faces.
I
began to realise that this wave of francophobia had surpassed recent expressions
of French anti-Americanism. Or rather, that it was different. Condescending
stereotypes and misrepresentations certainly abound in Paris. But I have never
been able to find the front page of a French newspaper with an American
official pictured as an animal—or even the equivalent of Christopher Hitchens'
comparison in the mainstream print press of Chirac with "a rat." No
political correctness stands in the way of France-bashing; you wouldn't see the
New York Post replace the face of an African, an Israeli or a Mexican
official with an animal face. Although extreme anti-Americanism does
occasionally achieve a degree of popularity in France, it is always followed by
a strong backlash from the mainstream media. Thus, Thierry Meyssan's popular
conspiracy theory asserting the American government's complicity in the
September 11 attacks provoked a unanimous and heart-felt condemnation from
across the French political spectrum.
Recent
events have thus forced me to reconsider my long-held assumption about anti-Americanism
being influential in France and anti-Europeanism, particularly francophobia,
being low-key in the U.S. In normal times, people here certainly care less
about Europe than Europeans do about the U.S. America as a cultural and
economic phenomenon permeates European life and European media in a way that
European culture certainly does not in Middle America. Rather than a reaction
to an overbearing presence, recent France-bashing in the U.S. has apparently
grown out of anger, rooted in a deeply-held patriotism, at France for
challenging the U.S and doing so with some success. "Iraq now, France
next" reads a new bumper sticker. And where in Europe would a news
presenter welcome you by describing his country as "the land of the free,
the home of the brave?" The distinct roots of American francophobia partly
explain its more virulent outcome—such as Peugeot-smashing, tabloid attacks and
boycott threats.
This
observation saddened me. I already knew it was part of my transatlantic
identity to defend America in Paris and Europe here, and never to feel
politically at home in either place. But suddenly this wave of clichés and
reduction to nationality seemed overwhelming. There was not much I could do if
people wanted to see Frenchmen only as appeasers or as peace heroes.
Objectivity and nuance seemed lost. This saddened me not really as a French
citizen, but rather as a someone who loves America.
© Financial
Times, 2003