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Condoleezza and Democracy : Five Transatlantic Challenges
Justin Vaïsse in Le Monde, Thursday 10
February 2005
Con dolcezza :
with sweetness. On February 8th, 2005, Condoleezza Rice modulated her
speech at Sciences-Po to the
musical intonation her parents chose for her first name. Transatlantic
reconciliation, cooperation, a new chapter in French-US relations, forgetting
the past... She was as far away as possible from her more martellato intonation of April 2003:
"Forgive Russia, ignore Germany, punish France."
And yet the past, and the implicit reproaches it
conveys, were not entirely absent from the sweeter-than-ever speech, since its
central theme – to establish a transatlantic partnership to promote democracy
on the basis of our common values – also resonated as a retrospective reproach
of France. The overthrow of tyrant Saddam Hussein, then the massive democratic
mobilization of Iraqis braving the attacks on January 30 to vote - is that what
France was trying to prevent in 2003?
It would be a mistake, nonetheless, to focus
exclusively on that aspect of "Condi's" speech, for the Secretary of
State raised real questions. At the level of first principles, she recalled
that the United States and France, more than any other nations, have received a
faith in the freedom and universality of democracy as their inheritance from
the Enlightenment. We can contest Bush administration methods, but the
neoconservative credo that democracy is for all peoples of all religions is
also ours. And our enemies are the same: "The face of terrorism in
Iraq, Abu Musaab al-Zarqawi, called democracy an "evil
principle." To our enemies,
liberté, egalité, and fraternité are also evil principles."
Certainly, neither Condi Rice's speech, nor Bush's
second term inaugural address on January 20th, constitute a realistic foreign
policy program. American political and strategic interests will always conflict
with the cause of democracy. Yes, American must rely on non-democratic allies
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, for example, in the fight against terrorism.
But this dilemma is also our own: these imperfect allies are France's also and
we know the choice of the lesser evil by heart, those compromises that we have
had to conclude with some of our close friends, such as Tunisia and Egypt.
Consequently, the true question is rather: what are
the best policies to promote freedom? Condi Rice expounded the American vision.
It is up to us Europeans, and perhaps particularly to us French, to more
clearly enunciate our own vision of how democracy should be promoted, of how we
intend to be faithful to our ideals and more effective in the transatlantic
framework.
Here are five paths of reflection that may further
understanding in this debate.
* First of all, should we precipitate democracy from
the outside, even by force of arms, or promote its unfolding from the inside,
even if that means waiting for a long time? Condi Rice emphasizes that
spreading democracy is an "urgent" task - and one may think
that Saddam Hussein would still be persecuting his population without American
intervention. However, at the same time, she herself emphasizes that the
specific rhythm of different societies must be respected and that
democratization must come from inside. And she takes as her example the success
of the Cold War... in which Europe and the United States favored containment,
consequently the status quo.
Europeans, for their part, prefer the politics of engagement, of pressure, and
(often timid) conditionalities to transform regimes from the inside, at the
risk that this patient policy may have but little impact.
* That preference is all the more marked as it
touches a second question: how are we to avoid the messenger's killing the
message? Unlike during the Soviet era, the support America gives to dissidents
today in the Middle East, to defenders of democracy, or even to moderate
Muslims does not strengthen them, but, on the contrary, robs them of
credibility in the eyes of the population, so "radioactive" has
America become in this region, its intentions suspect and methods criticized.
However, on the European side, must we for this reason ignore these dissidents
and appear to accede to their fate, put our ideals in our pocket and indicate
our preference for a democratic evolution only in a low voice?
* Third path: Must we proclaim democracy from every
roof-top and put it at the heart of our foreign policy as do the Americans
(Condi Rice wants to make it "the organizing principle of the 21st
century") at the risk of hypocrisy? If George Bush and his Secretary
of State talk about freedom, but never about "human rights" in their
speeches, it's because the latter apply to all, even their own administration,
which has frequently forgotten them (cf. Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, etc.). Europe,
on the other hand, insists on the force of our own example: it takes seriously
that "alliance of values" about which Condi Rice speaks. The
progress of multilateralism and of law upon which she insists - by way of the
International Criminal Court, for example - the neutrality and legitimacy they
confer, are an integral part of a policy of promoting democracy.
* Fourth path: Americans consider freedom as the
"key" to stability, development, and justice. Europeans say
that injustice makes freedom impossible. Thus, in the Middle East, every
advance in the peace process reinforces the moderates and every step back
reinforces the extremists, who will never bring democracy about. However, this justice
that is a condition for democracy also includes economic justice. Extreme
poverty, massive inequality, and degradation of ecosystems do not make good
bedfellows with democracy - Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac brought this up in
Davos on January 26, and European aid programs are necessary pillars for the
promotion of freedom.
* Finally and above all, if they care to effectively
promote democracy, Europeans and Americans must agree on the priority they wish
to accord it in comparison to other political objectives. The regime change in
Iraq was produced at the cost of a step backwards in the war against terrorism.
And with regard to Iran, the American refusal to clearly support the Europeans
and negotiate with Teheran, so as not to appear to legitimatize the mullahs'
regime, runs the risk of resulting in an Iran as little democratic as it has
always been – but also nuclear. Finally, how far is Condi Rice prepared to go –
and how far are we Europeans prepared to go – on the specific ground of
democracy vis-à-vis the big partners whose evolution is worrying: Russia and,
especially, China?
Justin Vaïsse is a historian specializing in the
United States. He teaches at Sciences-Po (Paris Institute of Political
Studies).