Iraq: France Faces Its Responsibilities

Le Figaro, February 03, 2003

Philip H. Gordon, Director, Center on the U.S. and France
Justin Vaisse, Visiting Fellow, Center on the U.S. and France

In his State of the Union address, President George Bush all but declared war on Iraq. He asserted, as had done chief weapons inspector Hans Blix, that Saddam Hussein was not serious about disarming and that he had failed to respect 12 years of UN resolutions, including the most recent one giving him a "final opportunity" to disarm.

There are, it should be acknowledged, some good reasons for opposing this war. The absence of substantial evidence of a nuclear program in Iraq (the existence of which would drastically alter the current debate) and lack of credible links between Saddam Hussein and Al-Qaeda leave parts of European and American public opinion skeptical. Moreover, the risks of regional instability, human loss, high economic costs and the reconstruction that would follow a war may outweigh the possible gains of military intervention (as opposed to living with containment and ongoing inspections). At the same time, however, one must acknowledge that the status quo entails high costs as well—the suffering of the Iraqi people, the risk of regional conflict, the political and economic costs of the American military presence in Saudi Arabia—that it carries risks for the future, and that a change of the current regional state of affairs would improve the situation.

Beyond the substance of the issue, the diplomatic bottom line is that France must now choose. On February 5 at the United Nations, Secretary of State Colin Powell is going to argue the merits of a military intervention and present additional proof of Iraqi noncompliance, while also making clear that the United States can act alone if it does not obtain cooperation from its allies. On January 20, Dominique de Villepin argued that nothing at this point justified a military intervention, even hinting that France could use its veto on the UN Security Council. Two days later, at the commemoration of the Elysée treaty, Jacques Chirac appeared to have abandoned the previously qualified French position and to have embraced the German position of categorical opposition.

French reluctance to accept an American fait accompli is understandable; but from a diplomatic standpoint it now finds itself in a delicate situation. Thanks to skillful diplomacy, Iraq was given a last reasonable chance by resolution 1441. But Iraq did not seize this opportunity.

It is untrue to say that war has been inevitable since the beginning: until perhaps mid-January, if Saddam Hussein had taken this last chance offered to him, the Bush administration would not have had the domestic and international support necessary for war and therefore would not have waged it. But the Iraqi dictator has made the choice not to respect its international obligations, furnishing on December 7, according to Hans Blix—and admitted by France as well—an incomplete declaration, refusing to admit the existence of arms and programs known to UNSCOM in 1998, and then blocking 1441's most useful tool for verifying disarmament—interviews of Iraqi scientists by the inspectors in private.

Of course, one can argue for giving the inspectors more time, but barring a radical change in the behavior of Saddam Hussein compared with the past 12 years, it is hard to see how disarmament could be achieved. Besides, how long can even the current level of weapons inspections be sustained without the credible threat of force?

In short, France has two choices: either it works within the logic of 1441, recognizing that Iraq has not seized the "final opportunity" to comply with its disarmament obligations; or it opposes the likely consequences either by vetoing an American resolution or by blocking a vote with a veto threat.

France must think through the consequences of following this second option:

1. The Security Council of the United Nations would be marginalized; this situation would reinforce the unfortunate precedent set by Kosovo and would incite the United States to distance itself from the multilateral organization. If the Security Council could agree, on the other hand, it would become more difficult for the United States to bypass it to undertake military action in future cases. It could, of course, be argued that giving the US a blank check at the Security Council would be a strange way to save it. But France should have taken that risk into account before agreeing to resolution 1441. Because if this resolution, passed by a vote of 15-0, propvided an opportunity to stop the escalation to war through Iraqi cooperation, it also warned of "serious consequences" in the case of non-cooperation. Furthermore, the Security Council has passed numerous resolutions demanding that Iraq respect its obligations and disarm; the continued violation of these resolutions poses a real credibility problem for the Council.

2. Europe would be severely divided. Of course, we can applaud the new vitality in Franco-German relations. But if the price of that is the degradation of relations with other countries, and the deepening of a divide between Paris and Berlin on one side and Great Britain, Spain, Italy and Eastern Europe on the other, a common European foreign policy will suffer considerable damage in the long run.

3. Transatlantic relations would also be seriously damaged. From the American side, it is obvious that such a break would re-enforce the unilateralist wing of the Bush administration, the school of thought that belittles "old Europe" and considers it impossible to work with Paris and Berlin. Such a split would weaken the cause of those Americans favorable to international cooperation.

4. It goes without saying that French and German participation, and therefore European involvement, in reconstruction efforts after a war would be infinitely preferable to leaving the United States to act alone. Working together, we can be more confident in assuring the Iraqi people that they will have a stable future, free and prosper. But if the Americans, alone, lose the peace after having won the war, the entire West will suffer the consequences.

5. Finally, a rupture at the Security Council would risk France being seriously marginalized not only in Middle East affairs, but in the global arena as well.

In short: France has done everything in its power to avoid a military solution and to guarantee the prerogatives of the Security Council. It might still have the possibility of offering Saddam Hussein a chance to play his last card, while negotiating a 30-day ultimatum with Washington, which could result in a voluntary and complete disarmament, or a coup d'état or exile...or war. In this last case, the fault will be Saddam's, and his alone.

Note: The views expressed in this piece are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the staff, officers or trustees of the Brookings Institution.